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The Unseen Regulator: The Role of Characterization
in First Amendment Free Exercise Cases
Recently, religion and the state have been conflicting more fre-
quently.' When these conflicts occur, will the religion or the state
yield? Clearly, the first amendment religion clauses shepherd the re-
lationship, limiting the intrusion of each into the affairs of the other.2
The establishment clause prevents the establishment of a state reli-
gion, through which the state might become subservient to the
church in some way.3 On the other hand, the free exercise clause
prevents intolerance, coercion, and total church subservience to the
state.4 On their face the religion clauses are clear: only religion is
protected. But this simple statement becomes quite complex in ap-
plication because religion is undefined. What is religion? Where is
1 The Christian Legal Society, an organization of Christian attorneys, judges, and law
students, moniters the progress of church-state litigation. It is currently tracking about 1200
court cases, six times the number just a decade ago. Gest, When Church and State Collide, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 5, 1984, at 42.
2 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The religion clauses have been erroneously characterized as mandating a separation of
church and state. As Justice Douglas pointed out in Zorach v. Clauson:
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there
shall be a separation of Church and State. . . . We sponsor an attitude on the part
of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish
according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.
343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952).
3 In total, the establishment clause does much more than proscribe the establishment of
a state church or a state religion. It goes beyond that to "command[] that there should be 'no
law respecting an establishment of religion.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)
(original emphasis). "[F]or the men who wrote the Religion Clauses. . . the 'establishment'
of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign
in religious activity." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970); see also Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
Establishment clause doctrine is currently in a state of uncertainty. After more than a
decade using the three-pronged test--secular purpose, primary secular effect, and no excessive
entanglement-as enunciated in Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13, and Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973), the Supreme Court failed to use the test in Marsh v.
Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983)(chaplain of state legislature), and applied it only loosely in
Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984)(city-sponsored nativity scene), speaking rather of
the danger of actually establishing a religion.
4 Consistent with the free exercise clause,
[n]either a state nor the Federal Government . . . can force or influence a person
. . . to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a . . .
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs [or] for church attendance . . ..
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the dividing line between religious and secular 5 activities?
The distinction is made difficult, in part, by the breadth of reli-
gious activity. Modern religious organizations do not limit them-
selves to traditional religious activities, such as Sunday school,
worship service, and mass. Religion has always been involved in the
social, educational, and political areas.6 Yet changes in our modern
society have made this involvement more pronounced. Extra-wor-
ship activites are no longer considered in relation to religion but are
viewed separately under modern thinking and might, therefore, be
labeled secular.
Consider a church-related, Christian high school, providing reli-
gious instruction as well as traditional reading, writing, and arithme-
tic, and assume that education is secular in nature and subject to
government regulation. Is the school (a) a religious institution which
serves some educational functions and thus protected by the first
amendment, or (b) an educational institution with a religious affilia-
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948) (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)).
Speaking of religious freedom in Braunfdd v. Brown, the Supreme Court stated that
"[a]bhorrence of religious persecution and intolerance is a basic part of our heritage." 366
U.S. 599, 606 (1961).
5 Secular is defined as "[n]ot spiritual; not ecclesiastical; relating to affairs of the present
(temporal) world." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1214 (5th ed. 1979). Webster's provides fur-
ther illumination, stating that something secular is "not formally related to or controlled by a
religious body" and also that something secular is "rationally organized around impersonal
and utilitarian values and patterns and receptive to new traits. . . -contrasted with sacred."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2053 (1966).
6 The involvement of religion in political activity is most clearly seen in the established
religions of the American colonies. At one time, nine of the thirteen colonies had established
religions, five of which still existed at the time of the Constitutional Convention. R. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 4 (1982). The involvement is seen, though less obvi-
ously, through the influence of Samuel Rutherford, author of LEX, REx, John Witherspoon, a
Presbyterian minister, and William Blackstone, author of COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND, on American common and constitutional law. SeeJ. WHITEHEAD, THE SECOND
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 28-34 (1982); see also C. SINGER, A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETA-
TION OF AMERICAN HISTORY 284 (1964). SeegeneraglyL. BETH, THE AMERICAN THEORY OF
CHURCH AND STATE (1958); A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 291 (1945).
William Wilberforce, in England, and the Quakers, in the United States, who fought
slavery because of their Christian faith, are examples of religious involvement in social re-
form. J. WHITEHEAD, supra, at 35.
Religious schools were in existence long before state public schools. In the early days
after the Revolution, the free Christian school was the predominant form of education. R.
RUSHDOONY, THIS INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC 115 (1978); see also, R. RUSHDOONY, THE NA-
TURE OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 21 (1978). The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, passed by
the Confederation Congress, stated in Article III: "[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge being
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of edu-
cation shall forever be encouraged," thus assuming that the schools would be a channel of
religion and morality. Cf. "Old Deluder Satan Act," note 37 inra.
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tion and not protected by the first amendment? Whichever charac-
terization a court chooses, nothing prevents a reviewing court from
choosing the other.
This situation occured in Bob Jones Universio v. United States .7
The trial court found that, although the University performed edu-
cational functions, it was primarily a religious institution.8 The court
of appeals and the Supreme Court, however, analyzed Bob Jones as
an educational institution that had some religiously-based policies.9
This re-characterization made the difference in the decisions: the dis-
trict court found that the first amendment protected Bob Jones and
its policies; the appellate courts found that it did not.'0
This Note examines the role of factual characterization in free
exercise cases as it relates to the degree of first amendment protection
afforded the activities of a religious organization." Part I discusses
preliminary considerations related to free exercise and to characteri-
zation. Part II discusses these concepts in relation to each other, as
illustrated by modern cases. Finally, Part III proposes a standard for
limiting a court's freedom to characterize in free exercise cases and
applies that standard to the cases discussed in Part II.
I. Preliminary Considerations: Free Exercise and
Characterization
When a party raises a free exercise claim, a court must make two
inquiries.' 2 First, the court must determine whether the belief system
qualifies as a religion.' 3 The Constitution does not define "religion."
7 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). The Bob Jones case is analyzed more extensively below. See
notes 63-88 in/raand accompanying text.
8 See notes 78-79 inra and accompanying text.
9 See text accompanying notes 69-70, 81-84 in/ia.
10 See text accompanying notes 80, 83, and 85 infra.
11 A full discussion of what is included by the term "religion" is beyond the scope of this
article, which assumes that the entities and belief systems in question qualify as a religion.
For a brief overview of the Supreme Court's statements, see notes 12-18 in/ra and accompany-
ing text. For fuller discussions, see, e.g., Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the Constitution: A Classifi-
cation Problem, 11 VAL. U.L. REV. 163 (1977); Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First
Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 579; Worthing, "Religion" and "Rehgions Institutions" Under the
First Amendment, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 313 (1980); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of
Religion, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1056 (1978).
12 These two inquiries are simply the expression of the doctrine of Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963): a practice based on a sincerely-held religious belief may be overridden
only when confronted by a compelling state interest that can be accomplished by no lesser
restrictive alternative. See notes 25-26 in/ra.
13 This inquiry is necessary to determine whether the claim is based on a sincerely-held
religious belief. See note 25 in/ra and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court, in Davis v. Beason,' 4 vaguely stated that " 'reli-
gion' has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and
to the obligations they impose."'15 This theistic Supreme-Being ele-
ment, however, is not a requirement of religion. 6 -Instead, the
Supreme Court allows a broad category of belief systems to be con-
sidered "religious": those beliefs that occupy a position in the mind
of the adherent equivalent to the position afforded a belief in God.' 7
14 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
15 Id. at 342. Likewise, Chief Justice Hughes, in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S.
605 (1931)(Hughes, C.J., dissenting), stated that "[t]he essence of religion is belief in a rela-
tion to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation." Id. at 633-
34. He went on to state that the assumption of the "existence of a belief in supreme allegiance
to the will of God" was necessary to any proper discussion of religious liberty. Id. at 634.
Compare the views of James Madison and others of his day, note 17 in/ra.
16 In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the Supreme Court struck down a state
requirement of a profession of belief in God before appointment as a notary public. The
Court was very emphatic in stating that
neither a State nor the Federal Government. .. can constitutionally pass laws or
impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither
can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those
religions founded on different beliefs.
Id. at 495 (footnotes omitted). In support of its position, the Court referred to the debate on
the ratification of the Constitution. Id. at 495 n.10.
The Torraso opinion is well-known for its footnote giving examples of such "different
beliefs." It states: "Among religions in this country which do not teach what would generally
be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secu-
lar Humanism and others." Id. at 495 n.l1.
17 This standard was first enunciated in United States v. Seegar, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Section 6(j) of the Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604 (1948), provided an exemption
for persons who, because of religious training and belief, conscientiously opposed all war.
Religious training and belief was defined to be "an individual's belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does
not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal
moral code." 62 Stat. at 613. The Court avoided a construction that would have imputed to
Congress an intent to pick and choose various religious beliefs for inclusion. Instead, it held
that "[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes
within the statutory definition." 380 U.S. at 176.
Before the Court considered a virtually identical case, Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970), Congress amended § 6(j) to remove the "Supreme Being" requirement. 81 Stat.
104 (1967). The Court reaffirmed its holding in Seegar, explaining that an objection "need
not be confined in either source or content to traditional or parochial concepts of religion" to
qualify for the exemption. 398 U.S. at 339.
Admittedly, these are cases of statutory construction and not of constitutional definition.
Yet commentators have argued that they establish constitutional principles. See, e.g., Clancy
& Weiss, The Conscientious Objector Exemption: Arobles in Conceptual Clarity and Constitutional Con-
siderations, 17 ME. L. REv. 143, 145 (1965); Rabin, When Is a Religious Belief Religious." United
States v. Seegar and the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 231, 240 (1966); Note, supra
note 11, at 1064. Given the Court's language in Seegar of the need to avoid picking and
choosing religious beliefs, 380 U.S. at 176, Justice Douglas' concurring opinion noting
problems with the language, id. at 188, and the fact that Chief Justice Hughes' language in
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The Court's statements are necessarily inclusive in nature, not exclu-
sive. An exclusive definition of religion may itself be a violation of
the first amendment, in that those belief systems that meet the defini-
tion would be favored over those that do not qualify, resulting in an
establishment problem.18
Second, the court must decide whether the aspect of the religion
in question merits free exercise exemption from government control
and regulation.' 9 Taking a position partially based on the writings of
Thomas Jefferson, 20 the Supreme Court first subscribed to a belief-
action distinction by which religious belief and opinion were abso-
lutely protected, but where the legislature "was left free to reach ac-
tions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order."'2 t The Court limited this freedom to reach religious action in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 22 and finally abolished it in Sherbert v. Verner.23
Macintosh, which the statute virtually quoted, was rejected in Torcaso, see note 16 supra and
accompanying text, those commentators are probably right.
Regardless, this position is far from that espoused by James Madison, the author of the
first amendment, who stated that religion is "the duty which we owe to our creator, and the
manner of discharging it." J. Madison, 4 Memorial and Remonstrance on the Reig4 ious Rights of
Mag reprinted in D. MANZULLO, NEITHER SACRED NOR PROFANE 71 (1973). In that day, the
"common, if not universal" definition of religion was "biblical theism." Whitehead,Judicial
Schizophrenia: The Family and Education in a Secular Society, 1982 J. CHRISTIAN JURIS. 49, 59.
18 Worthing, supra note 11, at 345-46; see also Slye, Rendering Unto Caesar- Defining "Reli-
gion "for Purposes of Administering Religious-Based Tax Exemptions, 6 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL. 219,
223 (1983).
19 Under current Supreme Court doctrine, this inquiry is determined by asking whether
the state has a compelling interest that can be met by no lesser restrictive alternative. See
notes 25-26 infraand accompanying text.
20 In 1804, when asked to declare a national day of fasting, President Jefferson refused.
In his now famous letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, he wrote:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his
God ...[ and] that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only,
and not opinions,--I contemplate with sovereign reverence [the Establishment
Clause, which] buil[t] a wall of separation between church and State.
Quoted in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
In Reynolds, Chief Justice Waite, writing for the Court, quoted a portion of the letter and
recounted some of Jefferson's involvement with religious liberty issues and then stated that
Jefferson's views could be taken "almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and
effect" of the first amendment. Id.
For an examination of Jefferson's views on religious liberty and the first amendment,
especially in relation to his "wall of separation" metaphor, see Note,Jeferson and the Church-
State Wall, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 645.
21 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). In the words of one commentator,
this view allowed religious practice to be regulated "to the same extent as would similar
action springing from other motives." Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctri
nal Development. Part I. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1387 (1967).
22 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The appellants, Jehovah's Witnesses, were convicted of soliciting
without a license and breach of the peace because of their distribution and sale of their reli-
[19841
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Belief and opinion remain strictly protected, 24 while religious prac-
tice is given greater protection than before: a practice based on a
sincerely-held religious belief may be overridden only when con-
fronted by a compelling state interest 25 that can be accomplished by
no lesser restrictive alternative.2 6
Before initiating this second inquiry, however, the court must
determine whether the nature of the particular activity in question is
religious and thus entitled to free exercise protection. That is, if the
activity, even though carried out by a religious organization or as
part of a religious belief, is not religious in nature, the court need not
reach the second question. 27 This determination is closely related to,
or even a part of the first inquiry, but it sets the tone for the second
inquiry. If the activity is religious in nature but involves actions that
are frequently thought of as secular, the court will reach the second
inquiry, but in its analysis may approach that inquiry from a secular
perspective. 28 This intermediate decision, which affects the nature of
gious materials. While not espousing a new standard, the Supreme Court reversed the con-
victions, finding no state statute defining such conduct as constituting a "clear and present
danger to a substantial interest of the State" and no such "clear and present menace to public
peace and order" as to constitute a common-law violation. Id. at 311. The shift had begun.
See Galanter, Religious Fretdoms in the United States.: 4 Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 217,
236-37; Recent Developments, Wiconsin v. Yoder, 18 VILL. L. REv. 955, 956-58 (1973).
23 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
24 "The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental
regulation of religious beliefs as such." Id. at 402 (original emphasis).
25 Id. at 406. With respect to the compelling state interest, Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority in Sherbert, stated that a rational basis was clearly insufficient but that " '[o]nly
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limita-
tion.'" Id. (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945));seealo Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)(interests of the highest order); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)(susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and imme-
diate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect).
26 374 U.S. at 407; see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (the state may
justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achiev-
ing some compelling state interest).
Like applying the term religion, applying the phrase least restrictive means is difficult.
Different persons see different levels of restriction in the same regulations. See, e.g., the stan-
dardized-test controversy in the context of the regulation of sectarian schools, discussed in
note 62 infia.
27 This logically follows from the early observation that only religion is protected. In
illustration, consider the Amish education case, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
The Supreme Court noted the need to distinguish between their religion and way of life, if
there were any distinction, because their practice would not be protected if it were "based on
purely secular considerations" and not "rooted in religious belief." Id. at 215. See generally id.
at 215-19.
28 One commentator has stated:
Once. . . the church acts outside this [spiritual] epicenter and moves closer to
the purely secular world, it subjects itself to secular regulation proportionate to the
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the second inquiry, is a matter of characterization.
Characterization is simply the process of legal labeling, or put-
ting a name on the problem.2 9 The judge must analyze the nature of
the problem to decide how it fits into the law. Stare decisis is a help-
ful guide, for prior cases establish the available labels. Yet few cases
exactly parallel one another, and lawyers have an uncanny ability to
analogize otherwise distinguishable cases, and vice-versa, when they
wish to do so. In addition, the inquiries are not simply factual or
legal; rather, they are significantly value-influenced. The decision
becomes "result-selective" such that the label chosen will lead to the
desired result, based on the values to be protected.30 Different per-
sons looking at the same situation may see different predominant val-
ues and thus reach different results.
These difficulties are exacerbated in constitutional litigation.
First, stare decisis is less binding in constitutional litigation than in
non-constitutional litigation, so the labels are more flexible and pro-
vide less guidance.31 Second, the Constitution itself is a value-laden
degree of secularity of its activities and relationships. A church acting outside the
epicenter may still enjoy some degree of first amendment protection, but its claims
may be evaluated in light of competing, and perhaps more weighty, general societal
interests.
Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious
Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1514, 1540 (1979).
29 R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.2 (2d. ed. 1980).
30 R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw § 88 (3d. ed. 1977). Leflar continues:
It is evident from the cases. that the characterization process is not in prac-
tice a purely mechanical one, nor one which is complete within itself. It is an essen-
tial early step in almost any legal analysis, but the step is one that can serve the
purposes of the legal artist as well as those of the legal logician. If more than one
characterization is logically available for a set of facts, and constitutionally permissi-
ble, the choice between the characterizations may turn on a judicial desire to
achieve justice in the particular case, on a public policy preference for one rule of
law over another, . . . or on something else other than pure logic.
Id. § 88, at 177-78. See generally id. §§ 86-89.
Judge Hutcheson once described some of these processes from a judge's perspective.
Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL
L.Q. 274 (1929). Basically, the steps are these: (1) the judge hears the facts of the case and
any applicable law; (2) he broods over the values involved, waiting for his "hunch"; (3) the
hunch, the "intuitive flash," hits and points to the predominant values and the desired result;
and (4) the judge characterizes his case, fitting it into the standard that reaches the desired
result. Id. at 277-78, 280. As Judge Hutcheson points out, lawyers do exactly the same thing;
they just limit the hunches they follow to those that get them to the end they are advocating.
Id. at 278; see alsoRadin, The Theory ofJudicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357
(1925).
31 Justice Brandeis, in his dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., explained the reason
for this difference. Stare decisis is usually important because "in most matters it is more im-
portant that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right . . . [especially
when] correction can be had by legislation." 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932). Yet, constitutional
[19841
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document. Values are found in both its terms and its structure, and
most Supreme Court justices recognize unwritten values.32 In the
context of a value-based inquiry like characterization, such a broad
range of values can support equally broad results. Third, the Consti-
tution is an open-ended document subject to many varied interpreta-
tions. As a result, the constitutional values are more easily tailored to
fit the desired result.33
decisions are nearly impossible to change by legislation, and constitutional amendments are
extremely rare; in fact, Justice Brandeis noted that up to that time, only the eleventh and
sixteenth amendments had successfully overruled Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 407, 409
n.5.
Justice Brandeis cited twenty-eight instances in which the Supreme Court had overruled
or qualified constitutional decisions. Id. at 407 n.2, 409 n.4. The pace has increased:
pre-1932 28
1937-1949 21
1949-1959 11
1959-1979 47
See Blaustein & Field, "Overrding"Deciion in the Supreme Court, 57 MICH. L. REV. 151, 151-56
(1958); Douglas, Stare Decisir, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 743 (1949); Maltz, Some Thoughts on the
Death of Stare Decisi in ConstitutionalLaw, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 467 (1980). One commentator has
stated that "no constitutional precedent-new or old-has been safe" from a majority of
either the Warren or Burger courts. Maltz, supra, at 467.
32 The right of privacy, perhaps the most famous of these unwritten values, illustrates the
problem with unwritten values and protections. While the majority found a right of privacy
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), they were unsure what constitutional provi-
sion protected it. Justice Douglas found it in the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights. Id. at
484. Justice Goldberg found it in the ninth amendment reservation of rights to the people.
Id. at 488-91 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Harlan took a third position, that the right
to privacy was founded in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, finding that
the Connecticut statute under review "violate[d] basic values 'implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty.'" Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)).
By the time of Roe v. Wade, the Court had unified somewhat behind the fourteenth
amendment due-process position. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). But compare Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion in Roe, saying that the fourteenth amendment due process clause pro-
tected the asserted rights, id. at 170, with his dissent in Griswold, saying that it did not. 381
U.S. at 528. Yet Justice Black, dissenting in Griswold, bluntly disagreed with all three views:
The Court talks about a constitutional "right of privacy" as though there is
some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed
which might abridge the "privacy" of individuals. But there is not.
I get nowhere in this case by talk about a constitutional "right of privacy" as an
emanation from one or more constitutional provisions. I like my privacy as well as
the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right
to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.
Id. at 508, 509-10 (Black, J., dissenting). If the justices are unsure ofthe constitutional founda-
tion of the right of privacy, how do they or we know that it is in fact a protected constitu-
tional right?
33 See Judge Hutcheson's comments, note 30 supra.
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II. Characterization in Action
Because of the delicate nature of the freedom of religion and its
importance in our free society,34 characterization is especially critical
in free exercise cases. The characterization of an activity as religious
or non-religious, even implicitly, has a profound effect on the scope of
free exercise protections afforded. Thus, characterization can easily
determine the outcome of the case. 35
When dealing with religious beliefs that are unpopular, that just
do not "feel right," or that violate some public policy, there is often a
(quite natural) competition between the "judgment intuitive" and
the actual free exercise protections. When such a conflict exists,
something must yield. Characterization can provide the accommo-
dation necessary to reconcile the extremes.
Just such a process seems to have affected several decisions of
both state and federal courts in recent years. This phenomenon has
occurred especially in the context of cases involving state regulation
of sectarian schools, federal tax exemption of racially-discriminatory
private schools, and federal income tax prosecution.
A. State Regulation of Sectarian Schools
Education is one of the most substantial functions of state and
local governments. 36 To further their interests in education, most
34 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Lemon v. Kurtzman, described the reli-
gion clauses as an "extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law." 403 U.S. 602, 612
(1971), quotedwith approval in Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3065 (1983) and Committee for
Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 761 n.5 (1973); accord Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
406 (1963)(highly sensitive constitutional area); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963)(delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious).
35 See Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 662 F.2d 88, 101 (1st Cir. 1981)(Coffin, C.J., dis-
senting)("So to characterize this case is, for me, to decide it."), rev'don reh'g en bane, 662 F.2d
102 (lst Cir. 1981), arfd. sub nom. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982).
36 "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society."
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). Modern figures bear out the continuing
truth of that fact.
State Expenditures (in billions of dollars)
Year All functions Education
1970 $131.3 $ 52.7
1975 230.7 87.9
1978 297.0 110.8
1979 327.8 119.4
1980 369.3 133.2
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1981, at 278 (102 ed. 1981).
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states have compulsory school attendance laws which require chil-
dren to attend either a public school or an approved private school.37
In recent years the number of private Christian schools has increased
at a high rate.38 Many of these schools, however, refuse to seek state
approval because of their religious beliefs; 39 rather, they seek exemp-
tion from all but a minimum level of state regulation. 40 At least four
state supreme courts have considered the issues in this church/state
conflict: Kentucky, Ohio, North Dakota, and Nebraska. Two of
these cases are especially noteworthy because of the characterization
37 The first compulsory education law in our country was adopted in 1642 by the Massa-
chusetts Bay Colony. Its focus was somewhat different from that of modern laws, however.
Often referred to as the "Old Deluder Satan Act," it stated:
It being one chief point of the old deluder, Satan, to keep men from knowledge of
the Scriptures . . it is therefore ordered that every township in this jurisdiction,
after the Lord has increased then [sic] to the number of fifty householders, shall then
forthwith appoint one within their town to teach all such children as shall resort to
him to write and read . . . . Foreasmuch as it greatly concerns the welfare of this
country, that youth thereof be educated, not only in good literature, but in sound
doctrine.
Whitehead, supra note 17, at 58.
Today, only Mississippi does not have a compulsory education statute. Bainton, State
Regulation of Private Religious Schools and the State.r Interest in Education, 25 ARIZ. L. REv. 123, 123
nn.1, 4 (1983). A somewhat current list of statutes can be found in L. KOTIN & W. AIKMAN,
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 333-397 (1980).
38 Because these schools are frequently unaffiliated with organizations that compile edu-
cational statistics and often do not report attendance to the state, accurate statistics are diffi-
cult to find. From 1961 to 1979, it is reported that the number of "Christian academies"
increased over 1070%, from 1400 to 15,000. Christensen, Fundamentalists target education, News
and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 5, 1979, at 1, col. 1. While private school enrollment
decreased on the whole in the 1970s, the enrollment of these private sectarian schools rose
from 570,000 in 1970 to 1,330,000 in 1980, an increase ofalmost 134%. Cummins, Non-Catholic
Christian Schools Growing Fast, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1983, at Al, col. 2. See generaly Catholic
Schools Report Gains, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1983, § 1, at 36, col. 2. One expert estimates that
twenty-five to thirty percent of the school population is enrolled in Christian schools, which
are starting at the rate of five to six a day. Rushdoony, An Historical and Biblical View of the
Famiy, Church, State, and Education, 1982 J. CHRISTIAN JURIS. 21, 27.
39 See, e.g., notes 46 and 51 in/a and accompanying text.
40 The views of different churches vary significantly with respect to the minimum level of
regulation they find acceptable. Most schools seem to be willing to comply with reasonable
health, fire, and safety regulations, but some refuse even this. See, e.g., Kentucky State Bd. v.
Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Ky. 1979); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 895 (N.D. 1980);
State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 189, 351 N.E.2d 750, 756 (1976). But see, e.g., State ex.
rel Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Neb.), appeal dismissed, 102 S.Ct.
75 (1981). There is also a disagreement concerning compliance with attendance-reporting
requirements. See, e.g., Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d at 189, 351 N.E.2d at 756 (complying). But see,
e.g., Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d at 574 (refusing to comply).
But when it comes to the substantive requirements of teacher certification, textbook lists,
and curriculum requirements, there is no disagreement: the sectarian schools want to be free
of state regulation. See, e.g.,Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d at 879; Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d at
574; Shaver, 294 N.W.2d at 886-87; Whiner, 47 Ohio. St. 2d at 198-99, 351 N.E.2d at 761.
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implicit in their decisions.4'
The North Dakota case, State v. Shaver,42 involved a criminal
prosecution against parents who had violated the state compulsory
school attendance law by sending their children to an unapproved
school operated by their church.43 To gain state approval, the school
would have had to employ only teachers certified in the state of
North Dakota, meet certain curriculum requirements, and comply
with state and local health, fire, and safety laws.44 The school did
not seek approval because the church believed that to do so would
violate its religious convictions. 45 The Reverend Mr. Rodell Bledsoe,
pastor of the church and principal of the school, testified that state
approval was objectionable because it is tantamount to state control.
He explained: "We believe the head of the Church is Jesus Christ,
and if I let the state become head of the Church, then I will be re-
moving the Lord from His position. '46 The Supreme Court of North
41 For a brief treatment of some of the issues involved and other related cases, see Annot.,
18 A.L.R. 4th 649 (1982).
The Kentucky case, Kentucky State Bd. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979), was
decided, not on the first amendment, but on the Kentucky constitution which provides that
"no[] .. .man [shall] be compelled to send his child to any school to which he may be
conscientiously opposed." Ky. CONST. § 5. The Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld certain
limited requirements, but struck down textbook requirements, teacher-certification require-
ments, and standards for teaching required courses. 589 S.W.2d at 883-84. This case is an-
other illustration that the state constitution may provide more protection than the federal
one. See id. at 879 n.3.
The Ohio case, State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976), did involve
the first amendment. See generally Carper, The Whisner Decision: 4 Case Study in State Regulation
of Christian Day Schools, 24 J. CHURCH & ST. 281 (1982); Casenote, Public Regulation of Prvate
Religious Schools, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 899 (1976). To be approved, private schools were required
to comply with a vast regulatory scheme. The Supreme Court of Ohio found the scheme to
be "so pervasive and all-encompassing [as to] ... effectively eradicate the distinction be-
tween public and non-public education." 47 Ohio St. 2d at 211-12, 351 N.E.2d at 768. The
state failed to justify its interest in the vast amount of regulation, id. at 217, 351 N.E.2d at
771, and the court found violations of the parents' interest in directing the upbringing and
education of their children, id. at 212, 351 N.E.2d at 768, and of the parents' free exercise
rights, id. at 218, 351 N.E.2d at 771. Other courts have distinguished Whisner because of
Ohio's vast regulations. See, e.g., State ex. tel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d
571, 578-579 (Neb.), appeal dismissed, 102 S. Ct. 75 (1981); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883,
898 (N.D. 1980).
42 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980). The decision of the Supreme Court of North Dakota
was unanimous, but one justice called for legislative evaluation of the situation. Id. at 900
(Pederson, J., concurring); see note 61 infra.
43 Id. at 885. For the North Dakota compulsory attendance statutes, see N.D. CENT.
CODE ch. 15-34.1 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
44 N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-3 4 .1-0 3 (l)(Supp. 1983); see 294 N.W.2d at 885, 893.
45 294 N.W.2d at 886-87.
46 Id. Testimony of one of the parents, as brought out by the state's attorney, is espe-
cially revealing:
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Dakota affirmed the parents' convictions in spite of their first amend-
ment claims, finding these claims overridden by the state's compel-
ling interest in education.47
The facts in State ex. rel Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church48 are simi-
lar to those in Shaver. Nebraska also has a compulsory school attend-
ance statute, and only schools approved by the State Board of
Education meet the statutory requirements.49 To be approved, a
school must comply with extensive curriculum, materials and equip-
ment, reporting, and teacher-certification requirements. 50 The state
sought an injunction against the continued operation of the Faith
Baptist Church's unapproved school. The defendants' position was
that the state had no authority to "approve" God's ministry and that
the state Department of Education was incapable of judging its relig-
Q. Would it actually be against your religious principles to seek state approval
of the school?
A. Yes, it would.
Q. And why would that be, sir?
A. Well, in the Bible, it tells us that we are to obey Supreme Power which is
God, and that's what the church and the church school does. Now, if the state was
to say you have to approve teachers, and that means that the supreme power we
would listen to would be the state.
Id. at 887.
47 Id. at 900. Since deciding Shaver, the Supreme Court of North Dakota has decided a
virtually identical case, State v. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220 (N.D. 1982). The court found that
the defendants in Riviniushad a religious conviction against the use of certified teachers, id. at
227, something not found in Shaver, 294 N.W.2d at 894, thus giving the defendants in
Riviniusa stronger case. In all other respects, the analysis and results in Rivinius were virtually
identical to that in Shaver, upon which the court relied heavily. Because of this similarity, the
analysis and criticism of Shaver in this article apply equally to Rivinius.
One of the bases of the state's interest, as stated by the majority in Rivinius, was a provi-
sion of the North Dakota constitution that instruction should impress upon the students the
importance of virtue and honest labor. N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; see 328 N.W.2d at 228.
Justice Pederson, concurring in the decision, made an interesting statement with respect to
that provision:
If I had been the trial judge in this case . . . [and i]f it were appropriately
raised, I would not hesitate to rule that the requirements of Article VIII, § 3, of the
North Dakota Constitution relating to teaching "truthfulness, temperance, purity,
public spirit, and respect for honest labor of every kind," are not being met by
public schools.
Id. at 232 (Pederson, J., concurring).
48 301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb.),appeal dismissed, 102 S. Ct. 75 (1981). See generally Commen-
tary, Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church Under Constitutional Scrutiny, 61 NEB. L. REv. 74 (1982).
49 The compulsory attendance statute is codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-201 (1980).
The State Board of Education has promulgated Rule 14, which provides that only schools
that the Board approves are considered to provide a program of instruction that complies
with the compulsory attendance laws. See 301 N.W.2d at 573.
50 State Board of Education Rule 14 establishes the requirements for Nebraska schools;
Rule 21, in conjuction with Rule 14, sets forth the teacher-certification requirement. See 301
N.W.2d at 573.
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iously-based philosophy. 5' The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld
the granting of the injunction, finding, as did the Shaver court, that
the state's compelling interest in education was sufficient to override
the defendants' free exercise claims.5 2
In both Shaver and Faith Baptist Church, the challenged school
was a ministry of the church, 53 a crucial fact. In Shaver, the parents
contended that the operation of the Bible Baptist School was an inte-
gral part of the ministry of its supporting church. 54 The Supreme
Court of North Dakota apparently agreed, for later in its opinion it
stated, without criticism or comment, that "the Bible Baptist School
began operation in January of 1979 as an integral and inseparable
part of the ministry of the Bible Baptist Church. 5 5 Likewise, in Faith
Baptist Church, the church maintained that "the operation of the
school is simply an extension of the ministry of the church. ' 56 Thus,
in both cases, the defendants maintained that the churches and the
schools were the same57 and that the schools, while performing edu-
cational functions, were religious in nature and purpose. The courts'
characterizations, therefore, should have reflected this religious em-
phasis and connection in their free exercise analyses.
Nevertheless, both state supreme courts minimized this relation-
ship, implicitly characterizing the schools as separate educational in-
stitutions. The courts spoke only of the educational functions and
the states' educational interests, downplaying the religious connec-
tions as if they were irrelevant. Neither court would dispute the reli-
gious nature of the churches involved. Thus, the courts defined the
defendants' religion for them by characterizing the churches and
schools as separate and distinct.
The problem with the education characterization is the baggage
that comes with it. In an effort to maintain equality of education,
51 Id. at 574.
52 Id. at 580.
53 A ministry of the church is a visible church activity that carries out the church's invisi-
ble, spiritual goals. By saying that the school is a minstry of the church, the school is put on
par with Sunday school and worship service. To use an illustration, the church and school
are not separate entities, but the school, as well as Sunday school, worhip service, and the bus
ministry, are all "slices" of the same "pie," the church. Interview with the Reverend Dr.
Vaughn Sprunger, pastor of the Community Baptist Church and Christian School of South
Bend, Indiana (April 29, 1984).
54 294 N.W.2d at 888.
55 Id. at 891.
56 301 N.W.2d at 574.
57 In Whisner the Reverend Levi Whisner, pastor of the Tabernacle Christian Church
and principal of the Tabernacle Christian School, testified that "[the church and school] are
the same." 47 Ohio St. 2d at 187, 351 N.E.2d at 754; see note 41 supra.
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these regulations for public, secular institutions are easily transferred
to the religious schools.58
But a state's compelling interest is in the education itself, not in
its regulation of education. 59 The distinction is that education is the
end, and regulations are the means to that end. A specific regulation
can be justified, in spite of its burden on free exercise, only if it serves
the compelling state interest and there is no lesser restrictive alterna-
tive, with the state bearing the burden of proof.60 In a number of
cases, courts have found that unapproved schools have provided bet-
ter education than the state--Shaver was one of these cases.61 Like-
58 One problem is that the state's interest does not extend to educational equality. While
state-controlled schools must maintain equal educational opportunities, Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), that has not been applied to schools not controlled by the state.
The state interest in those schools deals, not with equality, but quality, specifically the con-
cept of a "basic education." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 225 (1972); Commentary,supra
note 48, at 84 & nn. 66, 68.
59 Commentary, supra note 48, at 85. Because of this distinction, it should be possible to
meet the compelling state interest in education without complying with each of the state's
regulations. Id. Yet, as one commentator has pointed out, this distinction is rarely made by
the courts, and the courts in Shaver and Faith Bapta Church are not exceptions. Id. n.74.
60 Speaking of the state's interest in education in' Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court
stated:
Thus, a State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not
totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and
interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious
upbringing of their children so long as they, in the words of Pierce, "prepare [them]
for additional obligations." [citation omitted].
[H]owever strong the State's interest in universal compulsory education, it is by
no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests.
406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972).
61 Pastor Bledsoe, principal of the school, testified that the curriculum had the students
"somewhat ahead of the public school," and the state did not dispute the evidence. Shaver,
294 N.W.2d at 887; see Commentary, supra note 48, at 85 n.75.
This fact appears to have induced Justice Pederson's concurring opinion, in which he
stated:
It is disturbing to me when it appears necessary for courts to decide how much the
State, under the constitution, can interfere with a person's beliefs. . . . The basic
education of children has been, in recent times, thought to be the State's responsibil-
ity. Not only the courts, but the Legislature, should reexamine the tradition to de-
termine if perhaps the quality of education can be enhanced by allowing and
encouraging the Bible Baptist Church, and other similar church groups, to assume a
greater, unhampered role in providing basic education for our children. It appears
to be uncontested in this case that Bible Baptist Church's teaching methods produce
better results than are produced by the State's current methods. I would prefer that
the Legislature make greater efforts to reduce governmental infringements with reli-
gious liberties.
294 N.W.2d at 900 (Pederson, J., concurring).
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wise, standardized tests showed that the students in Faith Baptist
Church's school were one to two years ahead of the national aver-
age.62 In these instances, the state interests have been served in spite
of non-compliance with the regulations. Yet the courts held that the
regulations were part of the states' compelling interests.
Characterization moved the Shaver and Faith Baptist Church
courts from the difficult issue of state regulation of a religious minis-
try to the simpler issue of state regulation of a school, or at very least,
moved from a state interest in the end, the final educational result, to
an interest in the means, the state's regulations. Characterization
provided an easier path to the regulatory outcome.
B. Tax Exemptions to Racially-Discriminatoy Private Schools
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Bob Jones University v.
United States63 presents similar issues, but in a different context. Bob
Jones is a non-denominational, fundamental Christian, liberal-arts
university. Bob Jones University had its section 501 (c) (3) tax exemp-
tion 64 revoked by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") because of
alleged racially-discriminatory University policies: specifically, the
University forbids interracial dating and marriage among its stu-
dents and denies admission to partners in an interracial marriage. 65
The Supreme Court upheld the IRS' revocation of the tax exemp-
tion, reading into section 501(c) (3) the requirement that an organiza-
62 Dr. Cecil Reynolds of Texas A & M administered the California Achievement Tests to
the students of Faith Baptist Church's school and found them to be one to two years ahead of
the national norms. Address by the Reverend Everett Sileven of the Faith Baptist Church,
given at the Assembly of God Church, Alexandria, Virginia (Jan. 10, 1984).
Standardized testing has created a great deal of controversy in these cases, for a number
of Christian schools have contended that standardized testing provides a less restrictive means
of guaranteeing that the students receive a quality education. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Douglas v.
Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571, 579 (Neb.),appealdismissed, 102 S. Ct. 75 (1981); State
v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 901 (N.D. 1980) (Vande Walle, J., concurring). The Supreme
Court of Nebraska rejected the contention that the testing program would effectively protect
the state's interest. 301 N.W.2d at 579. But Justice Vande Walle of the Supreme Court of
North Dakota suggested that the testing program might in fact be more restrictive and entan-
gling than the statutory scheme then in force. 294 N.W.2d at 901.
63 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983),afg 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), rev'g 468 F. Supp 890 (D.S.C.
1978). See generally Note, Religion, Education, and Government Regulation: Implications of Bob Jones
University v. United Statesfor Congressional Decisionmaking, 34 S.C.L. REv. 885 (1983).
64 The subsection provides an exemption under § 501(a) for
[clorporations ... organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, sci-
entific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes ... no part of the
net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982).
65 103 S. Ct. at 2023; see also 468 F. Supp. at 894-95.
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tion must meet the common-law definition of charitable-that is,
existing for the public good and so conforming to public policy-to
be exempt. 66
Bob Jones interposed a free exercise claim that its policy was
based on sincerely-held religious beliefs. 67 The Court ruled that,
while the revocation of the tax exemption would "inevitably have a
substantial impact"' ' on Bob Jones and similar schools, the burden
was substantially outweighed by the government's "fundamental,
overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education .,69
In a footnote the Court revealed: "We deal here only with religious
schools-not with churches or other purely religious institutions; here,
the governmental interest is in denying public support to racial dis-
crimination in education. ' 70 Again, the inaccurate education char-
acterization is evident. By characterizing the University as both
religious and educational, then emphasizing the educational aspects
over the religious aspects, the court was easily able to justify regulat-
ing the University and overriding its free exercise rights.71
The re-characterization is more evident when taking a back-
ward look at the entire sequence of litigation, which began in 1971
when the University sought to enjoin the IRS from revoking its tax
exemption.72 The findings of fact of the district court included a
finding that the University "was originally founded and has contin-
ued to exist as a fundamentalistic, rel'gious organtiation which has cho-
sen the field of education, principally at the college level, as the
vehicle through which to teach and promulgate its fundamentalistic
religious beliefs." 73 As the case progressed, the Fourth Circuit char-
acterized the University as a "fundamentalist religious organiza-
66 103 S. Ct. at 2028-29, 2031. Justice Rehnquist based his lone dissent in the fact that
Congress had defined the requirements for tax-exemption "[w]ith undeniable clarity ...
[and n]owhere is there to be found some additional, undefined public policy requirement."
Id. at 2040 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He stated that "regardless of our view on the propri-
ety of Congress' failure to legislate we are not constitutionally empowered to act for them."
Id. at 2039; cf. id. at 2039 (Powell, J., concurring) (the balancing of these substantial interests
is for Congressto perform).
67 Id. at 2034; see 468 F. Supp. at 894 (finding of fact no. 6).
68 103 S. Ct. at 2035.
69 Id. (emphasis supplied). But see notes 78 and 87 infta and accompanying text.
70 103 S. Ct. at 2035 n.29 (original emphasis). But see notes 78 and 87 injfa and accompa-
nying text.
71 103 S. Ct. at 2029-30, 2035.
72 Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 341 F. Supp. 277 (D.S.C. 1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d 903 (4th
Cir.), reh g denied, 476 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1973), aJ'd sub nom. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416
U.S. 725 (1974).
73 341 F. Supp. at 278 (emphasis supplied).
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tion, ' '7 4 and the Supreme Court stated that "the University is
devoted to the teaching and propagation of its fundamentalist reli-
gious beliefs."' 75 The Supreme Court then ruled that injunctive relief
was inappropriate because of the Anti-Injunction Act. 76 When the
IRS revoked its tax exemption, the University paid a nominal sum
and sued for a refund. 77 The process began again.
In the new suit, the district court again found the University to
be primarily religious, stating that Bob Jones University is "a distinct
religious organization . . . compos[ing] its own religious order . . .
[that] also serves educational purposes. 7 In its analysis of the Uni-
versity's first amendment claims, the court reemphasized its finding
of fact and pointed out the distinction that could arise with different
characterizations. The district court stated:
The constitutional problem presented by defendant's revocation
is so severe that, as the Court has just shown, such conduct is not
sustainable even if it is assumed plaintiff is an educational organi-
74 472 F.2d at 904.
75 416 U.S. at 734.
76 Id. at 749. The Anti-Injunction Act provides:
Except as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 6672(b), 6694(c), and
7426(a) and (b) (1), and 7429(b), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment
or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or
not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.
I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1982). At the time of this litigation, the only statutory exceptions were for
suits brought in Tax Court to litigate deficiencies and suits brought with respect to the fore-
closure and judicial sale of property against which the United States had a tax lien. See 472
F.2d at 905.
77 103 S. Ct. at 2023.
78 468 F. Supp. at 895. The entire finding of fact is as follows:
8. Plaintiff's primary objective is in instructing, conveying, and disseminating its
fundamentalist religious beliefs. Although plaintiff performs certain scholastic func-
tions, religion reigns, molding every action, policy, and decision of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff's Biblical beliefs permeate every facet of the institution. Education is only
one of the means used by plaintiff to indoctrinate people with its Christian princi-
ples; religion controls and dominates education.
The fact that plaintiff is not affiliated with any denomination, yet, at the same
time, is totally guided by its fundamentalist beliefs, attests that plaintiff is a distinct
religious organization in and of itself. Plaintiff is not an educational appendage of a
recognized church that may allude in its educational processes to the beliefs of the
parent religious order. Instead, the organizational source of plaintiff's religious be-
liefs is the university. The convictions of plaintiff's faith do not merely guide its
curriculum but, more importantly, dictate for it the truth therein. Bob Jones Uni-
versity cannot be termed a sectarian school, for it composes its own religious order.
The Court finds that plaintiff's primary purpose is religious and that it exists as
a religious organization. The institution also serves educational purposes. The
Court further finds that during the year 1975 plaintiff religious organization was
organized and operated exclusively for religious and educational purposes.
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zation. This Court determines plaintiff to be a religious organi-
zation, and there has yet to be expressed any compelling public
policy prohibiting racial discrimination by religious
organizations. 79
The language implies that different state interests and standards of
state conduct apply, depending on the nature of the organization be-
ing examined. The district court held for the University.80
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit never overruled the
district court's finding of fact, but rather shifted the characterization:
"[The University] is a religious institution in its own right, as well as
an educational one.""' Later in its opinion, the majority shifted its em-
phasis further, stating that "[t]he University is an educational institu-
tion as well as a religious one."'8 2 The court of appeals found the
government's interest in eliminating all forms of racial discrimina-
tion to be compelling, thus overriding the University's free exercise
claims.8 3 The Supreme Court perpetuated this shift by stating that
the University "is both a religious and educational institution," 84 and
ruling that the government's interest in education was compelling.85
The shift did not go unnoticed, however. At the appellate level,
Judge Widener based his dissent largely on an analysis totally dis-
tinct from that of the majority.86 He stated:
Accepting the foregoing findings of the district court as cor-
rect, and even the majority does not claim they are clearly erro-
neous, and the previous findings of this court and the Supreme
Court, as we must, that Bob Jones University is a religious organ-
ization, we are dealing in this case not with the right of the gov-
ernment to interfere in the internal affairs of a school operated by
a church, but with the internal affairs of the church itself. There
is no difference in this case between the government's right to
take away Bob Jones' tax exemption and the government's right
to take away the tax exemption of a church which has a rule of its
internal doctrine or discipline based on race, although that
church may not operate a school at all.87
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court majorities
analyzed the University not as a church, but as a non-religious pri-
79 Id. at 899.
80 Id. at 907.
81 639 F.2d at 149 (emphasis supplied). But see text accompanying note 87 infra.
82 639 F.2d at 150.
83 Id. at 153-54.
84 103 S. Ct. at 2022.
85 Id. at 2035.
86 639 F.2d at 155 (Widener, C.J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 156.
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vate school. 88 This difference in characterization yielded the differ-
ence in the analysis that determines whether the government has
compelling interests supporting its policies. The University was un-
able to meet the standard applied in this alternative analysis and lost
its free exercise protection. Thus, characterization was ultimately
dispositive of the case.
C. Federal Income Tax Prosecution
The case of United States v. Sun Myung Moon 89 presents the charac-
terization problem in the context of another tax case. This case did
88 At first blush, this assertion appears to be incorrect. The Court's free exercise analysis
is very brief-
The governmental interest at stake here is compelling. As discussed in Part
II(B), supra, the Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating
racial discrimination in education-discrimination that prevailed, with official ap-
proval, for the first 165 years of this Nation's history. That governmental interest
substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners'
exercise of their religious beliefs. The interests asserted by petitioners cannot be
accommodated with that compelling governmental interest, and no "less restrictive
means" are available to achieve the governmental interest.
Id. at 2035 (footnotes and citations omitted). But to what education does this interest ex-
tend-all or just some? Specifically, does it extend to private, sectarian education, which
would be necessary to the Court's decision here?
The Court cited four cases in support of the government's interest: Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160 (1976); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Griffin v. County School Bd.,
377 U.S. 218 (1964); and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See 103 S. Ct. at
2029-30. Brown and Grf&in dealt with public schools and thus are inapplicable. Alorwood dealt
with all Mississippi private schools, sectarian and non-sectarian, but that case involved a state
textbook program, and the only first amendment analysis was a brief establishment clause
discussion. 413 U.S. at 468-70. Thus, Norwood does not provide precedent for the decision
either. Runyon v. McCrayy was the most recent of the cases cited by the Court. The case did
involve private schools, but non-sectarian ones. The Court made that point clear at the out-
set of its analysis: "[these cases] do not even present the application of [42 U.S.C.] § 1981 to
private sectarian schools that practice racialexclusion on religious grounds." 427 U.S. at 167
(original emphasis). Thus, not even Runyon is precedent for the Court's decision.
It is not that the Court could not have extended the state interest (free exercise implica-
tions aside), but the Court did not do so. The decision on whether the state interest of eradi-
cating racial discrimination in education applies to sectarian schools slipped through the
cracks. The early cases, cited by the Court, did not decide the issue: it was left for later
adjudication. But the Bobjones opinion speaks as if it had already been decided in the cases it
cited. It had not. In sum, one commentator's criticism of the court of appeals' decision is
equally applicable to the Supreme Court's decision. He stated that "the opinion blurs and to
some extent ignores the distinctions between non-religious private schools, religion-supported
[sectarian] private schools, and an educational institution such as Bob Jones, which is recog-
nized as a separate religious organization." Note, Revocation of Tax-Exempt Status of Religious
Schools-Conlict with the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Bob Jones University v. United
States, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 949, 954.
89 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3828 (U.S. May 14, 1984) (No.
83-1242).
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not involve the re-characterization by an appellate court as in Shaver,
Faith Baptist Church, and Bob Jones University. Instead, it involved the
unfettered discretion of a jury to characterize the activities in
question.9o
The Reverend Sun Myung Moon and Takeru Kamiyama were
tried for conspiracy and for filing false tax returns. 9' At issue was the
ownership of over $1.7 million in bank accounts held in the Rever-
end Moon's name at the Chase Manhattan Bank, as well as the own-
ership of $50,000 of stock issued to Moon.92 The government
asserted that the interest income from the bank accounts, as well as
the shares of stock, constituted gross income to Moon and should
have been reported on his personal tax returns. 93 Moon, however,
claimed that he held these assets in a beneficial capacity, as trustee
for the Unification Church of which he is the founder and leader,
and that the assets were held for religious uses. 94 The issue presented
was whether Moon held these assets for himself or as a trustee.95 Res-
olution of this issue depends on whether the assets were given to
Moon for religious purposes and whether they were so used. These
questions, while questions of fact for the jury, are religious inquiries;
therefore, the religious purposes and uses should only be decided in
the context of the beliefs of the Unification Church. 96
90 Brief for Appellant Sun Myung Moon at 43-44, United States v. Sun Myung Moon,
718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3828 (U.S. May 14, 1984) (No. 83-
1242).
91 718 F.2d at 1216.
92 Id. at 1216-17.
93 Id. at 1217.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 The questions are religious inquiries because they cannot be decided without inquiry
into the doctrine and practice of the Unification Church; indeed, they make no sense outside
of that context. Because they are religious inquiries, certain standards apply.
A secular court must respect the integrity of church doctrine and precepts. A court may
determine whether the doctrine is asserted in good faith, that is, whether it is sincerely held,
but it may not judge its reasonableness or validity. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78
(1944);see notes 102-03 injraand accompanying text; cf. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). This extends to church financing, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943), the distinction between religious and non-religious, Holy Spirit Ass'n v. Tax
Comm'n, 55 N.Y.2d 512, 435 N.E.2d 662, 450 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982), Heritage Village Church
v. State, 263 S.E.2d 726 (N.C. 1980), and church organization and government, Serbian E.
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,
344 U.S. 94 (1952).
The problem becomes especially acute when such doctrines and practices must be inter-
preted. Speaking on these issues with respect to church property litigation, the Supreme
Court has stated:
First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is
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The jury was empowered to decide this sensitive, key issue with-
out regard to the Church's view of its purposes.9 7 The trial judge
instructed the jury that "[i]f you find that the funds. . . were held in
trust by Moon . . . and used for church purposes . . . , then that
interest would not be taxable income to Moon." 98 He did not in-
struct the jury as to how to determine church purposes, nor did he
instruct them that they were bound to accept the church's statement
of its sincerely-held beliefs and principles as long as they found it to
be bona fide. Rather, the jury was instructed that the "religion...
of the defendants is of no consequence whatever . . . . [R]eligion
must have no part in your deliberations. "99 This instruction was
made in the larger context of an instruction against the use of race,
religion, and ethnic origin in the jury's deliberation, and was proba-
bly intended simply as a warning against prejudice. Nevertheless,
the summation of the instructions misdirected the jury's inquiries,
moving the deliberation away from the Church's sincerely-held reli-
gious beliefs. In sum, the jury was free to decide by any standards,
even wholly secular ones, what the defendants' and the Church's reli-
gious beliefs and purposes were and whether the defendants' actions
in using the funds were secular or religious. This freedom to charac-
made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine
and practice. If civil courts undertake to resolve such controversies in order to adju-
dicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free devel-
opment of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matter of purely
ecclesiastical concern . . . . [T]he [First] Amendment therefore commands civil
courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies
over religious doctrine. Hence, States, religious organizations, and individuals must
structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts
to resolve ecclesiastical questions.
Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
97 A court has two options in resolving a church property issue. First, the court can
simply enforce the decision of the church's own governing structure, following the approach
of Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). See Maryland & Va. Eldership v. Church
of God, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368-69 (1970). Second, the court can follow a "neutral principles"
approach that does "not . . . rely on religious precepts" and is not biased against any reli-
gious sect, but it must be flexible enough to resolve the dispute in accord with the desires of
the members. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979). See generally Recent Developments,
Limits on Judicial Review of Hierarchical Church Decisions, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 992 (1977);
Comment, Church Propery Disputes: The Trend and the Alternative, 31 MERCER L. REV. 559
(1980).
Both of these options seek to decide the issue according to the beliefs of the religion in
question. The approach used in the Moon case follows neither. Brief for Appellant, supra note
90, at 43-44.
98 718 F.2d at 1226.
99 Trial Record at 6538, quoted in Brief Amicus Curiae of the Center for Judicial Studies
in Support of the Petition for Certiorari at 6, Sun Myung Moon v. United States, No. 83-
1242.
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terize was a freedom to define the defendants' religion for them, and
it resulted in a circumvention of the defendants' first amendment
protections. 100
III. A Proposed Standard
Some standard is needed to guide the characterization process.
As illustrated by the cases above, a court's unfettered freedom to
characterize religious issues can have a chilling effect on first amend-
ment liberties. If, on the other hand, a court is required to accept
any statement whatsoever made by the religious entity, the religious
entity would hold unfettered freedom to characterize. The judiciary
would be vulnerable to fraud and sham, and the first amendment
would be easily abused. Where is the middle ground?
The problem here parallels the problem a court faces when try-
ing to decide if some philosophy, belief system, or set of practices is a
religion. To simply accept the assertion that the system is a "reli-
gion" would invite abuse. Yet, on the other hand, too great an in-
quiry into the beliefs of the system in question can easily result in
excessive entanglement and can invite a court to define the party's
beliefs for him. 101 The Supreme Court has attempted to strike a bal-
ance through its decision in United States v. Ballard.10 2 The courts may
not assess the contents of an asserted religious belief for truth or fal-
100 The Reverend Moon's convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit. United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52
U.S.L.W. 3828 (U.S. May 14, 1984) (No. 83-1242). In his petition to the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari, Moon questioned, inter alia, whether "the Religion Clauses permit licensing
a jury in a criminal case to substitute its lay views for the religious views of a church and its
members as to how property and authority should be allocated within the church." Petition
for Certiorari at i, Sun Myung Moon v. United States, No. 83-1242.
This case, both at the court of appeals and the Supreme Court, has generated a vast
number of amicus briefs. At least twenty-nine parties filed at least twelve briefs in support of
the petition for certiorari. The parties include the states of Hawaii, Oregon, and Rhode Is-
land; members of Congress, including Sen. Orrin G. Hatch; churches and church organiza-
tions, such as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and the National Catholic
Conference; political organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union; and legal
organizations such as the Center for Judicial Studies and the Christian Legal Society.
Typically, the amici have no particular sympathies for the Reverend Moon personally or
for the Unification Church, and some parties that have joined together in a brief are not
always in total sympathy with each other. Yet with the exception of the states of Hawaii,
Oregon, and Rhode Island (whose brief expresses concern about the case's effect on the en-
forceability of trusts), each of the parties is motivated by a concern over the way in which the
Reverend Moon was deprived of his first amendment freedoms of religion and speech.
101 See Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)(quoted in note 96
supra).
102 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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sity, but may only determine whether it is sincerely-held. 103
The same general ideas are also applicable in the characteriza-
tion context, and they form the foundation for the following pro-
posed guidelines:
Once an organization or belief system has reached the status of a
religion for first amendment purposes, a court must accept the
entity's or adherent's bona fide statement of what beliefs and ac-
tivities the religion entails. Such activities must then be charac-
terized and evaluated as religious activities, and any opposing
state interests must be compelling state interests in regulating
that activity as a religious activity.
This standard does not affect the question of "what is a religion?"; an
entity must qualify as a religion before this standard will apply. Thus,
the standards currently used to delimit religion would continue to
apply.10 4 Additionally, this standard does not affect what qualifies as
a state interest, or even as a compelling state interest. Instead, it lim-
its the class of state interests that can be considered sufficiently com-
pelling to override free exercise claims. I05 Finally, this standard does
not leave the courts overly vulnerable to abuse and sham. 10 6 While it
limits judicial inquiry, it does so in a way closely related to the limi-
tations enunciated in Ballard. In fact, the Ballard limitations have
little meaning if the entangling inquiries prohibited in Ballard are
103 The Ballard court stated that
[mien may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of
their religious doctrines or beliefs. . . . If one could be sent to jail because a jury in
a hostile environment found [his beliefs] false, little indeed would be left of religious
liberty.
Id. at 86-87; see J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 6, at 106 (only the particular adherent's sincerity of
belief may be examined); see also Comment, Real Property Tax Exemptions for Religious Organiza-
tions: The Dilemma of Holy Spirit Association v. Tax Commissioner, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1117,
1136 & n.53 (1983).
104 See notes 12-18 supra and accompanying text.
105 For example, while the state may have an interest in abolishing racial discrimination
in education, see text accompanying note 69 supra, there is no corresponding state interest in
abolishing racial discrimination in religious groups. Bob Jones, 468 F. Supp. at 899; see notes
79 supra and 124-26 infra and accompanying text. Likewise, there is a distinction between a
state interest in education and a state interest in the regulation of education. See notes 59-62
supraand accompanying text.
106 The courts have been able to prevent exploitations of the first amendment by religious
frauds. See, e.g., United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 443-44 (D.D.C. 1968); see also text
accompanying note 130 in/fa.
Admittedly, limiting the inquiry in this way will allow a few fraudulent claims to pass.
But just as our criminal-justice system views it to be better to acquit a guilty defendant than
convict an innocent one, so too is it better to exempt a few frauds than to deny first amend-
ment protections to a legitimately entitled party.
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permitted at this stage.107
Such a standard was set forth in Ho' Spirit Association v. Tax Com-
mission.10s The Unification Church had acquired three properties in
New York City and had applied for an exemption from the state's
real property tax.109 The Tax Commission denied the application,
the majority stating that the "political motives" of the Unification
Church required such a denial." 0 Because the commission found
that the church was not exclusively religious, the Church was not
entitled to the exemption, regardless of the usage of the properties."'I
The Church instituted an action, which the New York Supreme
Court transferred to the Appellate Division. 1 2 Based on the findings
of a Special Referee, the Appellate Division affirmed the denial, stat-
ing that the Church's "primary purpose is religious, but that [its]
theology, as expressed in Reverend Moon's writings binds it to a
course of political activity."'1 3 It also concluded that the Church's
"doctrine, to the extent that it analyzes and instructs on politics and
economics has substantial secular elements."' ' 4
The New York Court of Appeals fundamentally disagreed with
the approach of both the Tax Commission and the Appellate Divi-
sion and reversed." 5 The court opened its opinion by stating:
In determining whether a particular ecclesiastical body has
been organized and is conducted exclusively for religious pur-
poses, the courts may not inquire into or classify the content of
the doctrine, dogmas, and teachings held by that body to be inte-
gral to its religion but must accept that body's characterization of
107 Whether such inquiries are permitted in deciding whether the entity is a religion or
whether its actions merit free exercise exemption, since both questions must be answered in
the affirmative for the entity to prevail, the inquiries at either stage are equally dangerous.
Both create excessive entanglement and can cause a loss of free exercise protections. See text
accompanying notes 12-26 supra.
108 55 N.Y.2d 512, 435 N.E.2d 662, 450 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982). For an extensive analysis of
the case and the relevant issues as well as a pragmatic criticism of this New York Court of
Appeal's decision, see Comment, supra note 103.
109
Real property owned by a corporation or association organized or conducted exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, hospital, educational, or moral or mental improve-
ment . . . or for two or more such purposes, and used exclusively for carrying out
thereupon one or more of such purposes. . . shall be exempt from taxation as pro-
vided in this section.
NEW YORK RzAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420-a(1)(a) (McKinney 1984).
110 55 N.Y.2d at 519, 435 N.E.2d at 663-64, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 294.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 520, 435 N.E.2d at 664, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 294.
113 Id. at 526, 435 N.E.2d at 667, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 297.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 520, 528, 435 N.E.2d at 664, 668, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 294, 298.
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its own beliefs and activities and those of its adherents, so long as
that characterization is made in good faith and is not sham.11 6
While it appears that the Court's holding involved a question of the
definition of religion, it did not. In fact, the court explicitly dis-
claimed such a determination, stating that the Tax Commission, the
Special Referee, and the Appellate Division each recognized, at least
implicitly, that the Unification Church "at least in part is a religion,"
and specifying that "the issue is whether the activities which have
been found to be 'political' and 'economic' are for the purposes of
that statute to be classified as secular rather than religious."'1 7 Thus,
as one commentator noted, the focus of the opinion shifted from a
question of what constitutes a religion to a question of what "activi-
ties and beliefs which a concededly religious organization can engage
in without removing itself from the operation of the [real property
tax-exemption] statute." 18 When dealing with this question, the
court of appeals held that judicial inquiry was limited to two ques-
tions: "Does the religious organization assert that the challenged
purposes and activities are religious, and is that assertion bona
fide?" 119 The court reasoned that the first amendment allowed no
further inquiry. 120
The suggested guidelines would have altered at least the analy-
ses, and likely the outcomes, of the cases examined above. In the
Shavers and Faith Baptist Church cases, the state supreme courts down-
played the fact that the Christian schools involved were a part of the
ministries of their churches.121 Under the proposed standard, assum-
ing those claims are made in good faith, the courts would then be
required to characterize the schools as religious, not educational, in-
stitutions. The religious characterization would focus the free exer-
cise claims. Although the state might be able to impose regulations
on non-religious schools by showing a rational basis for so doing, a
compelling state interest would be required to regulate religious
schools. The state's compelling interest in education would not be
inapplicable per se, but the compelling interest is in the education,
116 Id. at 518, 435 N.E.2d at 663, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
117 Id. at 521, 435 N.E.2d at 664, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 294-95.
118 Comment, supra note 103, at 1164 (1983).
119 55 N.Y.2d at 521, 435 N.E.2d at 665, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
120 The New York Court of Appeals founded its reasoning on three Supreme Court cases:
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943); and United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87
(1944).
121 See notes 53-57 supra and accompanying text.
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not the regulations. 22 In sum, the guidelines would require a true
compelling state interest analysis, and not just an implicit rational
basis test. The court may ultimately restrict the defendants' free ex-
ercise rights, but such a restriction would be on the ministry as a
religious one, not a secular one. In Shaver and First Baptist Church,
because of the demonstrated quality of education these schools pro-
vided, the states' interests were satisfied.1 23 Thus, these schools would
be allowed to continue to operate, and attendance at these schools
would fulfill the compulsory education requirements.
The Bob jones Universiy case is similar to Shaver and First Baptist
Church, but the University's position is much stronger. Judge Wid-
ener's dissent noted the proper analysis: the University's free exercise
rights would be analyzed just as if the University were a church.124
This is the approach the district court followed, and it meets the
guidelines of the proposed standard. The allegedly discriminatory
practices are, in essence, regulations concerning membership. 25
Since there is no compelling state interest in regulating the member-
ship requirements of a religious entity, even if racially discrimina-
tory, 26 the revocation of the University's tax exemption would be a
violation of its free exercise rights. Thus, the University would retain
its tax-exemption.
Finally, in the Moon case, the judge would have been required to
instruct the jury to accept the statement of the Unification Church
regarding its religious purposes, unless they were to find that the
statement was not bona fide or the beliefs were not sincerely held.1 27
The jury would have had to decide the case in accord with those
beliefs. If, according to the Church's bona fide religious beliefs,
Moon received the assets for religious uses and so used them, the as-
122 See notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text.
123 See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
124 See text accompanying note 87 supra.
125 Students who violate Bob Jones' religiously-based interracial dating policies are ex-
pelled, and those who are interracially married are denied admission. 468 F. Supp. at 895; see
also 103 S. Ct. at 2023. In essence, the University is saying that "membership" is dependent
upon adherence to the stated religious doctrine.
126 The Supreme Court has described religious organizations as "voluntary . . . associa-
tions" and has said that they are to have full control of their policies, unless violative of the
law, including matters of faith, membership, and discipline. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 679, 728-29 (1871). The Court affirmed the principle of church autonomy in member-
ship practices in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), and again in Ser-
bian E. Orthodox Church v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). See text accompanying note
79 supra. See general( Note, Denying Tax Exemption to Racially Restrictive Religious Schools: An
Unconstitutional Infringement of Religious Membership Practices, 17 VAL. U.L. REv. 437 (1983).
127 See notes 96-97 supra and accompanying text.
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sets would not constitute his taxable property, and he would be
acquitted.
IV. Conclusion
As illustrated by recent religion clause cases, the unfettered
power to characterize is potentially harmful to the free exercise of
religious liberties. Even more than the power to tax, the power to
define is the power to regulate and even to destroy.1 28 In the field of
religious freedom, the power to define the contents of a religion is one
of the most important, if not the most important liberty included in
the freedom of religion.129 If the state, even the judiciary, were given
the power to define the contents of a religion, then the freedom of
religion would become meaningless: the government could suppress
any activity simply by defining the activity as secular and applying a
rational basis test.
These proposed guidelines-requiring religious characteriza-
tions founded on the religion's bona fide statement of its contents and
limiting the overriding state interests-offer broad protections. Yet
this standard is not so broad that almost anything could be exempted
from government regulation as a tenet of someone's religion: the
compelling state interest justification remains in full force, so long as
the compelling state interest is in regulating the religion as a reli-
gion.1 30 Any overbreadth problem that might exist is not caused by
the standard itself; this level of protection of a relizgion is necessary.
Rather, the definition of religion, not affected by the proposed stan-
dard, is extremely broad, and it is its expansion that causes the ex-
treme breadth.1 31 Regardless, for those entities that are religions and
for the activities they pursue, protection is a necessity. It must not be
denied.
Brent E Marshall
128 Slye, supra note 18, at 223; see also Worthing, supra note 11, at 345-46.
129 "Th[e] claim [that something is religious], obviously, is not asserted in isolation, but
always in the context of some other religious claim. It is the key to invoking all of the free-
doms that have been mentioned above." Galanter, supra note 22, at 255. See generaly id. at
255-64.
130 See Note, supra note 11, at 1078.
131 The current standards are discussed in notes 14-18supra and accompanying text. See
especially note 17 supra, regarding the expansion that has come about through the conscien-
tious-objector cases, Welsh and Seegar.
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